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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN AERIAL
HIJACKING: THE ROLE OF
INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATION
ROBERT P. BOYLE*
I WOULD LIKE TO COMMENT on what Mr. McPherson has said from
two different points of view. In the first place, I would like to talk
about the development of air law, international air law, through the
treaties he has mentioned. I would also like to talk a little bit about
the fact that the air law problem is one with a minor exception referred to
in the Montreal Sabotage Agreement,' which really takes account of what
you do with the hijacker after the hijacking has occurred, and you have
him in your clutches. It does not talk too much about what you can do
to prevent it; that comes through another avenue, another channel.
It seems to me that hijacking has been a developing kind of thing. It
has developed not only in terms of the nature of the hijacking that
occurred but it also has developed in the sense that many of the nations
of the world were not ready to take really affirmative actions to do
anything about hijacking until relatively recently. Ian McPherson said that
possibly we were clairvoyant at Tokyo. Well, I was chief of the U.S.
delegation at Tokyo, and I do not regard myself as being particularly
clairvoyant. As a matter of fact, I knew darn well at the time, that we
were leaving tremendous gaps in an effective system. However, as
Winston Churchill said, "Politics is the art of the possible," so we did
what we could do. We got as much as we could get and admittedly
we left major gaps in the international legal system.
There was no undertaking under the Tokyo Convention by anyone
to make aircraft hijacking a crime. There was no undertaking to see to
it that if a nation made it a crime it was one that was punishable by
severe penalties. Furthermore, there was no undertaking to do anything
with a hijacker once you had him in your clutches. Thus, while it might
offend the moral sense of the international community to have a hijacker
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standing in front of you and doing nothing to him, there was no legal
obligation on anyone to take action.
This was the situation in 1963 when the Tokyo Convention was
developed. From 1963 until 1969, or 1970, there was no further action
in the field of international air law to close the gap. I think the
Dawson Field incident, of Labor Day 1970, probably was the spur
under which the international community finally buckled down to work
again and produced the Hague Convention. 2
The Hague Convention closes the precise gaps we left at Tokyo.
First, there is an undertaking by every Nation signing that agreement, or
adhering to it, that they will make hijacking a crime under their
national law.3 Admittedly, this does not make hijacking an international
crime in the classic sense, but the obligation of states to make it a crime
under their national law probably is as good.
Second, states party to the Hague Convention agree to make
hijacking a crime punishable by severe penalties. 4 Third, they undertake
that they will, as Mr. McPherson said, either submit the offender to
prosecution under their law or extradite him. 5 These three undertakings, I
think, close a major gap. It was a great step forward when that was
done. It is a treaty that is now in effect. However, treaties, as
Mr. McPherson said, are good only when they are respected and
enforced. The United States at the moment is of the opinion that further
action is necessary to see to it that there is a mechanism (international
mechanism possibly, or hopefully, possibly even a domestic mechanism if
an international mechanism cannot be agreed upon) that will see to it that
some kind of sanctions are applied if a country does not respect an
international commitment, or if a country does not in effect comply with
what I believe this series of treaties is beginning to do-establish an
international norm of conduct.6 I hesitate to call it international customary
law because such law is not developed normally in this fashion.
Nevertheless, I believe that our constant action in developing treaties on
hijacking, the constant resolutions from the United Nations7 and the
International Civil Aviation Organization s calling upon all governments
2 T.I.A.S. 7192; entered into force, October 14, 1971.
3Id. Art. 2.
41d. Art. 2.
5 Id. Art. 7.
6 See Statement by the Secretary of Transportation and the Council of ICAO, Sept.
18, 1970.
725 U.N. SCOR, 1552nd meeting 1 (1970).
8 ICAO Res. A17-3, cited at 9ILM 1276.
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to apply the central major provisions of these treaties, even though they
have not ratified them in appropriate cases, certainly has the effect of
creating an accepted international norm of conduct even though it is not
quite the traditional classic international customary law.
In any event, we, in the United States, believe that an additional
sanction is necessary in order to assure that nations who do not comply
with an international standard of conduct have something happen to
them. This is where it is very difficult for us to get any agreement at the
moment. We thought action had been taken looking in this direction. A
resolution was adopted by the Council of the International Civil Aviation
Organization 9 at U.S. instigation. The Secretary of Transportation went
to Montreal and presented it on behalf of the President, following the
Dawson Field incident. This resolution, among other things, indicated
that possibly multilateral action against an offending nation might be
appropriate in some circumstances. This is a very carefully, cautiously
worded resolution, as it has to be. The language of government,
particularly the international Secretariat is exceedingly tortious, so that
the resolution was very cautiously worded but nevertheless, it was there.
We got a majority adoption of that by one vote, a most unexpected vote
I must admit. Thus, we thought that appropriate action was going forward
so, working with our good friends in Canada, we produced a draft
convention which we put on the table at a Legal Committee meeting in
London in 1970. We thought we were making good progress and then all
of a sudden in Vienna a year ago last June, the General Assembly of
ICAO backed off from the council resolution and decided no more work
was to be done on that subject in the Legal Committee of ICAO.
We did not give up. We kept pushing it, and I think the result of the
events of this last summer; the Lufthansa hijacking, with the $5-million
ransom; possibly to some extent the Munich Olympics incident; a number
of such things combined to create an atmosphere in which it was possible
for us to persuade the Council of ICAO to reactivate the study. As
Mr. McPherson pointed out, we had a very recent Legal Committee
meeting in September of 1972 in Washington. I do not want to say
the meeting was successful, but certainly there was further progress
toward possible agreement on a convention which would apply some
sort of sanction to an offending nation. At least enough agreement was
reached that a full ICAO Legal Committee Meeting in January 1973, was
desirable, and we can hope for a diplomatic conference possibly in
9 ICAO Council Resolution on Hijacking, of 19 June 1972, 11 ILM 897.
Spring, 1973]
3
Boyle: Symposium: Aerial Hijacking
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1973
AKRON LAW REVIEW
the summer of 1973. That is where the international law aspect stands.
As you see, it is still developing.
ICAO also has been very active in developing international standards
and practices for use in preventing hijacking. They have produced what
I think is a very creditable job of manuals containing standards and
suggestions with respect to all forms of security at airports. For example,
the separation of the air side of an airport from the ground side; the kind
of screening of passengers and luggage that should be undertaken;
the exchange of information with respect to potential hijackings or
saboteurs, etc. All of these things have been done by ICAO.
There was an Extraordinary Assembly of ICAO convened specifically
for the purpose of considering all of the things that might be done to
prevent hijacking. The Assembly produced a resolution which has about, I
would say, fifteen to twenty pages of recommended actions that all of the
Contracting States of ICAO are implored to undertake. The trouble with
all of these measures is that they take money. You cannot put a
magnetometer on a gate without spending the money for the magnetom-
eter. You cannot provide fencing or lighting around the perimeter of an
airport without spending money. The financial aspect is one of the
problems that faces airport security today. The airlines shoulder some of
the burden, possibly a fair share of it, although some think not. I am not
going to argue the point. The fact of the matter is that airport security
is a costly and expensive business, and the communities of the world, and
the states of the world, are going to have to spend money to provide
more protection at the ground side than they have at the moment.
We can do what we wish with a hijacker when we have him in
our clutches providing the world community agrees, but the safest thing
to do is prevent him from ever getting off the ground.
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